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Abstract
Methods for the analysis of `big data' on citizen-government interactions are necessary
for theoretical assessments of bureaucratic responsiveness. Such big data methods also
stand to benet practitioners' abilities to monitor and improve these emerging trans-
parency mechanisms. We consider supervised latent Dirichlet allocation (sLDA) as a
potential method for these purposes. To this end, we use sLDA to examine the Mexi-
can government's (non)responsiveness to all federal information requests led with the
federal Mexican government during the 2003-2015 period, and to identify the request
topics most associated with (non)responsiveness. Substantively, our comparisons of the
topics that are most highly predictive of responsiveness and nonresponsivess indicate
that political sensitivity plays a large and important role in shaping ocial behavior
in this arena. We thus conclude that sLDA provides unique advantages for, and in-
sights into, the analysis of (1) textual records of citizen-government interactions and
(2) bureaucratic (non)responsiveness to these interactions.
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Introduction
Across the world, citizens and their governments are increasingly interacting through
electronic and online mediums. Virtually every national government now oers a range
of public services over the web, and over 90 countries currently provide and manage fully
integrated online service portals for their citizens (United Nations, 2016).1 Well over 100
countries have now similarly adopted access-to-information (ATI) laws that allow citizens
to request information, documents, or data from their governments, and that require o-
cials to respond (Berliner, 2014; Michener, 2011). An increasing number of these ATI laws
also incorporate online systems for ling requests and receiving responses (Fumega, 2014).
These new forms of citizen-government interaction speak directly to issues of bureaucratic
responsiveness, transparency, and accountability, and regularly generate massive amounts of
administrative data in the forms of text and outcomes (Connelly et al., 2016; Pew, 2018).
For example, under Mexico's ATI law, citizens now le and receive responses to well over
100,000 requests per year from federal government entities. The US Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) system is larger still, and receives approximately 700,000 annual requests a year,
though with a mounting backlog (Noveck, 2016).
The availability of citizen request data of this scale opens new and innovative avenues
for research, and has the potential to contribute both to scholarly understandings of bureau-
cratic responsiveness and to monitoring and evaluation eorts by policymakers and advocacy
groups.2 However, to achieve these aims, researchers require analytic tools that can jointly
examine the substance of citizen request texts alongside the responses they generate. Like-
wise, and given the immense volume and complexity of information handled within modern
systems for citizen-government interaction, ocials also increasingly need to identify and
leverage such tools if they intend to eectively monitor ocial responsiveness, performance,
and compliance. These challenges have not gone unnoticed by past research (Noveck, 2016;
1Discussions of the global spread (and evolution) of e-government and e-democracy (e.g., West, 2004;
Dawes, 2008; Lee, Chang and Berry, 2011) are also highly illustrative in these regards.
2Such insights also have the potential to contribute to understandings of ICT-enabled public participation
more generally (e.g., Lodge and Wegrich, 2015; O'Brien et al., 2017).
Lavertu, 2017; Pew, 2018; Fox, Haight and Palmer-Rubin, 2011).
In light of these issues, this paper makes three primary contributions. First, we demon-
strate the benets and possibilities of using big data on citizen-government interactions to
study government responsiveness and accountability in relatively new, technology-enabled
settings characterized by high levels of volume, velocity, and variety in available data. Sec-
ond, we evaluate the utility of an under-utilized method  supervised latent Dirichlet allo-
cation  for exploratory and inductive research in understanding interactions characterized
by open/shut responses. Third, we illustrate how these results can also shed light on
theoretical debates over the motivations for (and against) bureaucratic responsiveness.
To do so, we consider data from one specic ATI regime for which we have access to
comprehensive records of every single citizen request for government information: the case
of the Mexican federal government. Following Mexico's landmark 2002 ATI law, each and
every individual ATI request led with federal government agencies has been made publicly
availablenow over one million requests in total. Alongside the text of each individual
request, related metadata is also stored and made available, including information on the
nature of the Mexican government's response to each request. Analyzing the Mexican federal
government's responsiveness to these individual ATI request texts accordingly allows us to
simultaneously assess (i) existing explanations of bureaucratic responsiveness in this context
and (ii) the applicability of several recently developed text-as-data methods for this endeavor.
In undertaking these tasks, we evaluate a supervised machine learning method that we
argue is ideal for the interpretation and discovery of political cues associated with bureau-
cratic (non)responsiveness in big data settings characterized by large corpora of unstruc-
tured texts and associated metadata. Specically, we propose supervised latent Dirichlet
allocation (sLDA) as an optimal method for the tasks described above, and evaluate this
approach against several more widely used supervised classiers. While an extensive litera-
ture now exists on the development and use of supervised machine learning methods for the
classication of political and social text (Hopkins and King, 2010; Jurka et al., 2013), such
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methods provide researchers with limited resources for undertaking rigorous evaluations of
the text dimensions that are identied as most predictive of a given outcome. At the same
time, unsupervised topic modeling methods developed in the social sciences and elsewhere
enable users to uncover, and to theoretically evaluate, the common themes underlying large
text corpora, but generally do not allow researchers to relate such quantities to an external,
document-level outcome measure during estimation.
As we demonstrate below, sLDA provides social scientists with a means of jointly leverag-
ing the advantages of both supervised learning and topic modeling approaches. In doing so,
it allows one to achieve superior predictive accuracy than more common supervised machine
learning approaches, while also oering the benets of thematic (i.e., topical) interpretability
and discovery. Together, we contend that these features make sLDA a promising framework
for inductive needle-in-a-haystack-type research goals. These tasks commonly arise in in-
stances where researchers or bureaucrats seek to sift through large corpora of texts in search
of small but thematically coherent subsets of cases, documents, or themes that uniquely ex-
hibit high predictive leverage vis-à-vis some external outcome. Other possible applications
for this type of research include any setting where textual records are subject to positive or
negative outcomes, such as complaints, case les, investigations, awards, or even censorship.
We illustrate the methodological and theoretical merits of such a task in the context
of Mexican ATI requests through a demonstration of how sLDA allows one to identify a
small but potentially politicized subset of ATI request topics that in turn reliably predict
the relatively infrequent event of a denied request. Our proposed research framework is
particularly appropriate for this setting, given that past research suggests many informa-
tion requests may be mundane or easily dealt with through ordinary procedures, whereas
a select `tip of the iceberg' may be far more politically relevant (Michener and Worthy,
2015). Our ndings in these regards suggest that instances of highly nonresponsive behavior
among government Importantly, while many past studies of ATI responsiveness (Lagunes
and Pocasangre, 2017; Wood and Lewis, 2017; Worthy, John and Vannoni, 2017; ben Aaron
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et al., 2017; Poole, 2018; Spá£, Voda and Zagrapan, 2018; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2019)
have used experimental approaches, submitting similar requests across multiple government
bodies, this observational approach accordingly allows us to account for the full real-world
diversity of citizen uses, many of which are too context-dependent or sensitive to feasibly or
ethically deploy in research settings.
This paper proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of the ATI system and bureaucratic
responsiveness in Mexico, we describe our corpus of Mexican ATI request texts, the steps
used to preprocess this corpus for analysis, and the sLDA method. We then use sLDA to
predict ocial (non)responsiveness towards Mexican ATI requests in both an in-sample and
out-of-sample context, as measured by the probability of a denied request. Alongside these
endeavors, we assess our sLDA-derived topics for political relevance, and nd that the topics
that are most strongly associated with nonresponsiveness do indeed exhibit markedly more
political sensitivity than do the topics most associated with high responsiveness. One the
other hand, we also nd that one topic associated with high responsiveness is related to
employee absenteeism and potential corruption in the education sector. This association
suggests an important distinction between exposing wrongdoing at the national level 
where it may be politically damaging  and at the local level  where disclosure may
serve the interests of the political center as a form of re alarm monitoring (McCubbins
and Schwartz, 1984). We also compare the sLDA approach to several alternative classiers,
and nd that its performance is superior to these more widely used supervised methods.
Our conclusion discusses the implications of our ndings, and the broader promise of sLDA
methods for big data social science research.
Background
Democratic institutions are founded on the notion of responsive government, but respon-
siveness is usually limited and incomplete. Many scholars have studied why political actors
may be more or less responsive in dierent circumstances  both at a macro-scale in terms
4
of how government policies and spending respond to the preferences of the median voter
(Cleary, 2007; Golden and Min, 2013; Herrera, 2017) or to elected legislatures (McCub-
bins, Noll and Weingast, 1987; Saltzstein, 1992; West and Raso, 2012), and at a micro-scale
in terms of individual citizen-government interactions (Chaney and Saltzstein, 1998; Balla,
2000; Yang and Callahan, 2007; Butler and Broockman, 2011; McClendon, 2016; White,
Nathan and Faller, 2015). Often the latter approach focuses on ATI requests (Peisakhin
and Pinto, 2010; Lagunes and Pocasangre, 2017; Wood and Lewis, 2017; Worthy, John and
Vannoni, 2017; ben Aaron et al., 2017; Poole, 2018; Spá£, Voda and Zagrapan, 2018; Grim-
melikhuijsen et al., 2019), which correspond to individuals' or organizations' requests for
public information from their government, and that government's degree of responsiveness
to those requests in terms of information provided. In these literatures, explanations for
responsiveness usually include capacity, resources, organizational cultures, social barriers or
discrimination, as well asimportantlypolitical incentives.
Below we examine this form of responsiveness within one specic ATI system: bureau-
cratic responses to public information requests in Mexico. To do so, we use a comprehen-
sive dataset of over one million information requests led with federal Mexican government
agencies. These correspond to queries made by individual citizens, legal representatives,
businesses, and NGOs to specic Mexican federal government agencies, and cover, for ex-
ample, requests for information on government spending, environmental disputes, or police
records. Due to the unique online information platform created by Mexico's 2002 Ley Federal
de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental (LFTAIPG), the text
of each of these requests, along with associated metadeta, has been made publicly available
going back to mid-2003. One of the most innovative features of the LFTAIPG was its online
information platform, which is used to manage requests, responses, and appeals. Citizens le
requests and receive responses primarily through this system, which was ultimately named
INFOMEX. Where citizens le written requests, these are still managed through INFOMEX.
In these cases, agency ocials enter the relevant metadata information, and then scan and
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upload the actual request (text) as an attached image le. Over the 2003-2015 period,
non-electronic requests initially encompassed roughly 7% of all INFOMEX requests, before
declining to represent approximately 2% of all INFOMEX requests in more recent years.
While LFTAIPG has improved Mexican citizens' abilities to seek government informa-
tion, agency ocials nevertheless have several reasons to remain strategically nonresponsive
to ATI requests. Above and beyond general workload concerns and inapplicable requests,
ocials charged with responding to requests may often be sensitive to the political po-
tential of particular requests. To the extent that requested information may risk adverse
consequences for a given agency or the governing partythrough, for example, negative me-
dia attention, advocacy group campaigns, or even corruption investigationsagency ocials
may refuse to provide legitimately requested information.3 Potential examples include eorts
to expose bureaucratic ineciency, nancial sector policies, bias, patronage, or corruption
in public procurement or employment practices, or even matters related to the Drug War
and cartel activity. Because the ocials responding to individual requests are housed within
specic federal agencies, they have clear incentives to protect the reputation of their govern-
ment agency, the federal government on the whole, and/or the governing party.4 The fact
that several ocial response justications provide agency ocials with an ability to mask
politically-motivated denials (Fox, Haight and Palmer-Rubin, 2011) only further incentivizes
this potential behavior.
On the other hand, there are also theoretical reasons to expect that, under certain
circumstances, ocials may actively prefer disclosure. Some scholars have suggested that
transparency mechanisms may serve as a form as re alarm monitoring (McCubbins and
Schwartz, 1984), particularly where it is in the interests of the central government to identify
and address wrongdoing at the local level before it becomes broadly public (Distelhorst, 2017;
Schnell, 2017; Michener, 2015). Busuioc and Lodge (2016) also argue that accountability-
3This may also involve the use of dierent procedures applying greater political scrutiny, such as the
amber-lighting documented by Roberts (2006) in Canada.
4Despite merit-based policies for some appointments in Mexico, personal loyalties and even party ali-
ations continue to play a signicant role in hiring and promotion (Dussauge Laguna, 2011, p. 62).
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enhancing measures can serve bureaucratic organizations' goals of cultivating positive repu-
tations. Empirically, the Mexican case might also be expected to be less prone to politicized
responsiveness, given its widely-hailed legal and procedural best practices, online request
portal, and active and independent information commission (Bogado et al., 2007; Bookman
and Guerrero Amparán, 2009). Indeed, Lagunes and Pocasangre (2017) found little evidence
of discrimination on the basis of requester identities. These insights suggests that political
biases in government nonresponsiveness to ATI requests may not be as straightforward as one
might initially expect, making topic modeling an ideal strategy for discovering ATI request
themes that are more or less associated with government (non)responsiveness.
Measuring (Non)Responsiveness
We now turn to discuss how our key outcome variable of interest was coded for the
Mexico case. As with any study of ATI responsiveness, coding the dependent variable is
complicated by the specics of the ATI legal regime, including the possibilities of both
legally valid denials, and non-compliant disclosures (Lagunes and Pocasangre, 2017; Wood
and Lewis, 2017; Worthy, John and Vannoni, 2017). We focus on clear denials to ATI requests
that could have received a fullled response in dening our denied requests indicator.
This binary indicator accordingly endeavors to encompass only requests that were denied
for potentially political or noncompliant reasons. As such, we do not include every poten-
tial justication for information not being provided as a denied request, given that some
justicationssuch as this request could not be processed, this request does not fall under
the purview of Mexico's ATI law, or not the competency of this entitypredominantly
(although not exclusively) arise in cases where the requestor failed to properly upload infor-
mation (e.g., their referenced attachment), had already submitted an identical request that
was responded to, requested information that was veriably not covered under Mexico's ATI
laws, or requested information that was held by another government ministry or agency.
Instead, we classify any ATI request refusal that received justications of the requested
information does not exist, the requested information is classied or condential, or the
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requested information is partially classied or condential as a denied request. We include
the latter (classied/condential) categories given the potential for these categories to be
overused in cases of agents withholding politically sensitive information. With regards to
the former category (i.e., does not exist), research suggests that Mexican agencies have
discovered that this is the least risky way to deny requests for information in cases where
they did not want it released or when assembling it would be a large burden, given that
in contrast, the burden of proof is on the agency if it claims that information requested
is `condential' or `reserved ' (Fox, Haight and Palmer-Rubin, 2011, p. 14). Classied or
condential responses may also be for legitimate reasons, such as national security, privacy,
or other legal exemptions. However, these too may be misused by ocials to avoid disclo-
sure. For example Almanzar, Aspinwall and Crow (2018, p. 11) nd evidence that security
exemptions are often inappropriately used, suggesting that some agencies are not certain
(or truthful) about whether an issue is truly a security issue.
After retaining the subset of denied requests that is delineated above,5 we nally take
care to omit any cases still pending as of August 2015, to avoid conating denied requests
with requests still awaiting response. Our nal denied request indicator is fairly imbalanced
with roughly 10% of retained requests receiving a denied request by our denition.
Information Request Features
We focus on the ATI request texts themselves as our primary predictors.6 These texts
correspond to each requestor's own open-ended description of the specic information that
they are requesting. Because public ocials are the primary responders to these requests,
we believe that the themes found across these requests, and their potential degrees of politi-
cization, will help to predict bureaucratic (non)responsiveness.
We thus downloaded all requests from Mexico's publicly-available online information
request interface for the period from 06/2003-08/2015. As mentioned above, this allows us to
5This led us to omit 8,996 total requests, representing roughly 0.9% of our nal request sample.
6We exclude requests for personal data as those are made under a dierent legal regime and handled
through dierent procedures that are also part of the INFOMEX system.
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recover every federal-level ATI request made within Mexico during this time period, including
requests that were originally submitted non-electronically. While most requesters described
the nature of their requests within the designated eld, a smaller subset (roughly 13%)
included a portion or all of their request as an attachment. Because omitting these would
yield an unrepresentative sample, we separately downloaded each attachment, digitized the
text, and appended it onto the main request text eld.7 Consistent with past research (e.g.,
Bagozzi, Berliner and Almquist, 2016; Berliner, Bagozzi and Palmer-Rubin, 2018), we then
truncated all remaining texts from the thousandth string onwards. This created our primary
corpus, which was further preprocessed using standard steps for the automated analysis
of political texts. These steps are described in detail in our Supplemental Appendix, and
together produced a corpus of 1,003,756 requests.
We next appended the names of each request's designated federal government agency
to our processed texts. Although Mexico's publicly available ATI data omits requesters'
individual identities, each information request contains metadata on the federal government
agency (hereafter target agency) that the requester made their request to. As these agen-
cies vary in their levels of politicization and administrative capacity, we anticipate that a
request's agency-designation, like a request's textual content, will inuence the degree of
(non)responsiveness to a given request. Agency information was therefore included as an
additional eld within our request text input data by appending all agency names as unique
features within our request text corpus.8 Together these agency names encompass roughly
300 distinct Mexican federal ministries and other agencies for our sample. Hereafter, we refer
to these combined `request + agency' documents as request documents for convenience. In
the robustness section further below, we additionally evaluate the unique contribution of this
feature to our predictive tasks. We specically do so by rst estimating comparable models
that omit this agency information, and then evaluating changes in predictive accuracy.
7Fewer than 1% of attachment les were corrupted, meaning that we were unable to extract their corre-
sponding text for inclusion here.
8When doing so, we transform agency names into unigrams such that, e.g., Instituto Nacional de Desar-
rollo Social appears as Instituto-Nacional-de-Desarrollo-Social.
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Supervised Latent Dirichlet Allocation
Topic models have been shown to be highly valid for the discovery of latent thematic con-
tent within information request texts (Berliner, Bagozzi and Palmer-Rubin, 2018; Berliner
et al., 2020). As such, the present article evaluates the utility of supervised latent Dirich-
let allocation (sLDA) models (Blei and Mcaulie, 2003) for the prediction of bureaucratic
(non)responsiveness to these same request texts. As a supervised topic model, sLDA is de-
signed to identify groupings of words (or word-stems) that are most predictive of a document-
indexed response variable. These groupingshereafter referred to as topicsare estimated
from a model that treats each document as containing a nite mixture of underlying topics,
where the topics themselves are specied as an innite mixture over a latent set of topic
probabilities. One's document-level responses are then regressed on these estimated topic
frequencies in a manner that restricts responses to be non-exchangeable with words (Blei
and Mcaulie, 2003).
For this sLDA framework, our ATI request texts are treated as mixtures of multiple la-
tent topics. Each topic can then be represented by a subset of words contained in within
(and across) our ATI request documents. For our Mexican information request corpus, such
topics may relate to the thematic area of an information request (e.g., requests pertaining
to social/health services) or of the requester's broader agenda (e.g., admonishments about
political corruption). We anticipate that these estimated topics will be thematically mean-
ingful, and that some will indicate potential politicization in responses rather than denials for
straightforward matters of legal compliance. We thus expect that our modeling of all topics
across all request documents will aid in the prediction of government (non)responsiveness, as
measured by our denied request measure. In our sLDA models, we specify the distribution
of this response variable to be logistic and employ collapsed Gibbs sampling.
The corresponding topics that are uncovered by this sLDA model have the potential to
be qualitatively distinct from those identied by unsupervised topic models such as latent
Dirichlet allocation (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003) or the structural topic model (STM; Roberts
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et al., 2014). Blei and Mcaulie (2003) intuitively highlight this potential, in noting that,
[...] when the goal is prediction, tting unsupervised topics may not be a good
choice. Consider predicting a movie rating from the words in its review [...] good
predictive topics will dierentiate words like `excellent', `terrible', and `average,'
without regard to genre. But topics estimated from an unsupervised model may
correspond to genres, if that is the dominant structure in the corpus' (121).
Similarly, for our ATI application, we contend that prediction-oriented supervised topic
models, such as sLDA, uniquely oer the potential for the identication distinct topics within
thematic areas of ATI requests, which may in turn allow one to distinguish between politi-
cally sensitive requests and apolitical requests within a given issue area. One example of this
potential would be the thematic area of government procurement, where an (unsupervised)
LDA model may only group requests based on their (non)correspondence with this theme,
whereas an sLDA model trained on denied requests may instead identify separate subgroup-
ings pertaining to (i) anti-corruption campaigns conducting oversight of procurement and (ii)
government contractors seeking information pertaining to their own procurement contracts.
Additionally, our modeling of denied request as an outcome variablevia sLDArather
than as an explanatory variableas allowed for under an STMis also the most appropriate
temporal approach in our context, given that ocial responses to request texts arise after
(as opposed to prior to) the generation of our request texts themselves.
Researchers must assign the number of topics, k, to be estimated within sLDA as well as
a set of associated α and η hyperparameters. We utilize ve-fold cross-validation to identify
an optimal number of topics for the task of prediction. Herein, we draw a random sample
of approximately 250,000 information requests (i.e., roughly 25% of our full request-corpus)
and then randomly partition this sample into ve folds of training and test data.9 For each
set of training data, we hold our α and η hyperparameters xed at 1.0 and 0.1, respectively,
9Training data are used for the initial tting of our models and for the corresponding generation of
parameter estimates. Test data are fully withheld from this model tting stage, and are then combined with
our training model's parameter estimates to generate predictions of our test data outcomes. Such predictions
provide a more objective sense of sLDA model performance, and guard against in-sample overtting.
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and estimate a series of sLDA models where the number of topics, k, is sequentially set
to k = {5, 20, 50, 100, 250, 500} and where our outcome variable is assigned as the denied
request measure described above. We then use each resultant model's output to initialize
a validation sLDA model using each fold's corresponding test sample. With these results
in hand, we calculate the area under each test sample's corresponding receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve (i.e., the AUC) and precision-recall10 curve (i.e., AUC-PR) to
summarize each model's performance in classifying denied requests. The AUC aggregates
our model's (true positive versus false positive) denied request classications across all
possible thresholds into a single measure of threshold-invariant classication performance.
The AUC-PR provides a similar aggregate measure of classication performance, but in
relation to a classication trade-o curve (precision versus recall) that is more attuned to
outcomes with moderate to high class imbalance. Given the relative rarity of denied requests,
we favor the latter metric in our assessments below.
Figure 1 plots the corresponding AUCs and AUC-PRs for all k's evaluated (dashed lines),
along with mean AUCs and AUC-PRs (solid lines). Across both subgures, we nd that an
optimal number of topics for the task of predicting denied requests falls closest to k = 250.
This k yields the highest average AUC and AUC-PR for our cross-validation sample while
still oering substantial improvement over the next smallest topic number evaluated (i.e.,
k = 100). We hence set k = 250 for all sLDA models below.
With our topic number identied, we next determine the optimal values for α and η.
In this case, we hold our topic number xed at k = 250, and then draw a second random
sample of approximately 250,000 ATI requests from the remaining request documents in
our corpus (i.e., approximately 25% of our full sample; excluding the 250,000 that we drew
for the topic number selection routine). As before, we randomly partition this sample into
ve folds of training and test data. For each training set, we estimate sLDA models where
α and η are sequentially set to unique pairings within the sets α = {0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 5, 10}
and η = {0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 5, 10}. We use each resultant model's output, along with its corre-
10Precision and recall are fully dened further below.
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In-Sample Topic Results
In order to fully assess our in-sample sLDA results for denied requests, this subsection
rst discusses our topic-specic coecient estimates for our in-sample sLDA model. This is
followed by an evaluation of the topics that we nd to be most predictive of (non)responsiveness
based upon these estimates, and then provide an assessment of in-sample classication.
For our in-sample sLDA model, nearly all 250 topic-specic estimates are statistically
signicant under traditional thresholds, with the vast majority implying either an increase
in responsivenessor a slight increase nonresponsivenesswhen present. However, a small
number of topics exhibit uncharacteristically large eects on (non)responsiveness in each
model. To view these eects, we recover the logit coecient estimates from this in-sample
model and plot these quantitiesalong with 95% condence intervalsin Figure 3.
Figure 3 sorts our sLDA model's logit coecient estimates by order of magnitude along
the y-axis, and presents the magnitudes of these coecient estimates on the x-axis (in log-
odds scale). Here we nd that the majority of recovered topics moderately decrease the
likelihood of a denied request. For instance, if we exclude the ve largest positive eects in
Figure 3 and converting the remaining eects to odds ratios, we nd that the average topic-
induced estimated eect corresponds to a 58% decrease in the odds of a denied request.
However, the ve largest positive coecient estimates in Figure 3 instead imply an average
1,684% increase in the odds of a denied request. The topwords associated with these latter
ve topics are clearly worthy of further examination. We conduct this assessment further
below, alongside an evaluation of the topwords associated with the ve topics identied as
most strongly decreasing the odds of a denied request.
For our substantive assessments of the ve topics most positively and negatively asso-
ciated with a denied request, we consider (i) the 20 words most highly associated with
each topic and (ii) qualitative readings of the 50 documents most highly associated with
each topic. With regards to topwords, we extract and report these topwords based upon
word scores below. Word scores denote the logged number of times that a given a word is
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Figure 3: Estimated Eect of Each Topic on the Probability of a Denied Response
assigned to a topic, divided by the logged total number of times that that word is assigned to
all other topics. This metric accordingly allows us to interpret topics based upon the words
that exhibit both (i) a strong association with a given topic and (ii) a relative uniqueness
to that topic.12 These 20 word score topwords are presented for each aforementioned high
and low leverage topic within Table 1. For these topwords, we have de-stemmed all relevant
topwords and have then translated each resultant word to English.13 With regards to our
qualitative readings of the 50 documents most highly associated with each topic of interest,
we use our sLDA model's topic-conditioned word assignments to identify and assess each
topic's 50 most relevant requests. We also report Spanish and English-translated versions of
two highly associated requests for each denied/provided topic in our Supplemental Appendix.
Denied Request Topic Interpretations
The ve topics that are most likely to receive a denied request largely appear to be
investigative in nature, or to otherwise pose direct threats to a responding agencies' re-
12We also report topwords based on posterior probability of word-to-topic assignmentwhich is a metric
that does not downweight topwords that appear frequently across topicsin our Supplemental Appendix.
13The original Spanish versions (both stemmed and de-stemmed) appear in the Supplemental Appendix.
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Table 1: Topwords for Topics Associated with (Non)Denied Request
(English-Translated Topwords, Based on Score)
Denied#1 police, federal, part, fact, authorization, elements, daily, past, security, capture
Denied#2 bank, value, deposit, bank, said, institute, commission, saving, account, accreditation
Denied#3 coordination, administration, general, republic, attorney general's oce, work, accurate, federal, position, legislation
Denied#4 request, information, etc., nature, refers, mention, written, documents, documentary, contain
Denied#5 insurance, request, information, delivery, south, conscated, date, I require, also, specify
Provided#1 education, school, sta, teacher, hours, professors, technology, baccalaureate, DGETI, appointment
Provided#2 education, school, SEP, higher, primary, secondary, level, students, school, teacher
Provided#3 how much, which, history, existence, country, INAH, archeology, each, monuments, they are
Provided#4 budget, assigned, destination, exercise, radio, annual, item, program, expenditures, televisions
Provided#5 wage, salary, position, tabulator, monthly, level, perceptions, salary related, benets, compensation
sources or reputations. For example, Denied#1which exhibits topwords such as police,
federal, capture, and securitycontains among its most representative requests several
requests seeking copies of government reports related to the search for the escaped cartel
leader Joaquín El Chapo Guzmán. These requests specically seek information on Mexican
government knowledge and performance during instances where El Chapo was on the verge
of capture but escaped, whilst implying that collusion existed between the government and
organized crime in these regards. The remaining representative Denied#1 requests similarly
seek information relevant to the police or other security services, including details on rings,
demotions, desertions, deaths in the line of duty, and reports on police activity in specic in-
cidents. Together these requestsand our broader readings of the top 50 requests associated
with this topicindicate that this topic encompasses requests that seek information about
past police practices or actions, with an eye towards identifying potential abuses of power,
corruption, or broader security failures. Such requests are clearly politically sensitive, given
media attention and public outrage over government conduct of the drug war. While some
of these responses may be legitimate denials in cases of classied information, others are
likely to indicate misuse of discretion in order to avoid scrutiny, as has been demonstrated
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in other cases of security-related requests (Almanzar, Aspinwall and Crow, 2018).
Denied#2, on the other hand, primarily encompasses requests for information on nancial
savings and deposits, in both public savings schemes and in private banks. The topwords as-
sociated with Denied#2 include words such as bank, value, deposit, saving, account,
and accreditation. The top 50 requests associated with this topic largely focus on bank
failures and the oversight role of Mexico's banking regulator in this process, suggesting that
this topic exhibits clear political potential.14 Several of the most representative requests for
this topic seek information concerning savings funds set aside during the US-Mexico Bracero
Program. A number of additional top 50 requests allude to the 2014 Ficrea credit union fraud
scandal in Mexico, or its aftermath. Others seek details on Mexican banks that recently an-
nounced bankruptcy, with a potential focus on protecting or recovering savings. These latter
requests could legitimately fall under protected exemptions, or they could seek information
which no longer exists. On the other hand, they might also threaten to saddle agencies with
new nancial costs, or direct unwanted scrutiny on the banking regulation systemtwo clear
instances where political biases in government nonresponsiveness may arise.
Denied#3 relates to requests concerning political appointments, government ocials, and
oversight thereof. A majority of the topwords associated with this topic are clearly political
in nature (e.g., administration, federal, position, and legislation) and Denied#3's most
highly associated requests frequently target Mexico's Procuraduría General De La República
(i.e., the Attorney General's oce). The topic's most associated requests seek very specic
and very extensiveinformation on the appointments to bureaucratic positions, and their
associated salaries and responsibilities; often with reference to specic job codes and titles.
These requests are also highly legalistic in language and typically reference very specic laws
or statutes as justication for the requested information. Requests of this sort could be
perceived by government ocials as corresponding to public eorts to investigate patronage
or unqualied appointments, and thus as having high political potential. On the other hand,
14Though some top 50 requests may have received denials not due to concerns over political sensitivity, but
rather because requesting information was genuinely limited to the public (e.g., individual bank accounts).
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the combined breadth and specicity the majority of top 50 requests for this topic may imply
that denials for these requests were just as commonly issued due to the unavailability of (or
diculty in assembling) the actual information requested. As such, we conclude that this
topic's political potential is less clear-cut than was the case for Denied#1 and Denied#2.
Denied#4 appears to relate to scrutiny of federal procurement, and related compliance
issues. Denied#4's topwords exhibit a focus on specic documents in these respects, and this
topic's most associated requests pertain to (i) an IMSS15 food-contract corruption scandal,
(ii) the relative numbers of direct, public bid, and invited procurement awards for various
agencies, or (iii) information on federal agency-imposed nes against various banks and
companies, and related information on whether these nes were contested and/or paid. These
types of information are highly relevant for investigations of corruption or other irregularities
in public procurement, a notoriously corrupt sector in Mexico. Underscoring this point,
we can also note that many of the requestors within the top 50 most associated requests
for this topic self-identify themselves as a Contraloría Ciudadana or Contraloría Social.
These position titles correspond to social/citizen comptrollers in the context of Mexico,
who function as citizen volunteers with the direct responsibility of conducting procurement
oversight in the interest of combating corruption. In light of the above above, Denied#4
appears to have signicant political potential.
Denied#5's topwords include words such as insurance, conscated, specify, and
date. Its most representative requests encompass detailed queries into the specic prop-
erties seized and/or conscated in various federal drug-crime arrests, including information
on the addresses of the properties seized, the type(s) of seizure/forclosure, the amount of
assets seized, and the conscated items' current status for a specic named individual in each
request. For example, the fth most associated request with this topic seeks this range of
information in relation to a Mexican cartel member known as `La Gata,' who was captured
by Mexican authorities in 2007.16 Such requests may arise from legal representatives of the
15Mexico's Social Security Institute.
16https://www.proceso.com.mx/207490/cae-el-narco-oscar-alonso-candelaria-escajeda.
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arrested individuals seeking to recover conscated property, or from members of media and
related anticorruption campaigns seeking to identify misuse of conscated resources among
government agencies. Interestingly, while the most representative Denied#5 requests were
made using an identical templatewith only the aected individual's name changedthere
is substantial variation in the justications for denials among this topic's most highly asso-
ciated requests, with responses ranging from reserved/classied (4), information does not
exist (16), and this request does not fall under the purview of Mexico's ATI (12).
Provided Request Topic Interpretations
In contrast to the top ve Denied topics, the ve Provided topics in Table 1 are much
less likely to be interpreted as politically threatening by responding agencies. Provided#1
and Provided#2 each encompass sets of requests that seek varied information on public
education in Mexico. The topwords across these two topics include words such as education,
school, professors, students, teacher, and technology. In the case of Provided#1, the
50 most associated requests are frequently about personnel in educational institutions. This
is interesting in that many of these could yield information on wrongdoing such as patronage
hiring or absentee employees, but this is not politically sensitive at a national level. The
fact that these requests receive routinely positive responses suggests that the federal-level
education ocials in Mexico may have their own interests in rooting out these sorts of bad
practices in their subsidiary institutions.17 On the other hand, Provided#2 encompasses
requests for aggregate statistics on (i) educational enrollment,18 (ii) educational spending, or
(iii) budgets and spending of Mexican states more generally. Reecting the apolitical nature
of this topic, the requestors within several of these requests were quite clear up front that
they needed the information for their own educational research.
Provided#3 appears to encompass fairly mundane requests concerning land-use or zoning
issues, especially in the context of historical preservation. Topwords corresponding to arche-
17Though other top requests associated with this topic appear to be from educational personnel themselves,
and seek either information on those individual's own employment or a list of available job opportunities.
18E.g., total student enrollments or enrollments separated across various demographics or grade-levels.
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ology, monuments, and INAH19 reinforce this characterization. A closer examination of
the top 50 associated requests suggests that the requests underlying this topic are primarily
seeking aggregate statistics for archeological sites, urban growth boundaries, or coastal zon-
ing. Provided#4's top 50 requests largely pertain to simple requests for budgetary-related
requests for entire states, state-sponsored scientic research, the national theatre, or the me-
dia sector. Topwords such as radio, annual, program, expenditures, and televisions
are reective of this interpretation. The subset of requests for budgetary information related
to the media sector, specically, could be related eorts to scrutinize the misuse of ocial
advertising budgets, and hence, of having political potential. However, a majority of the
most highly associated requests for this topic are very succinct and straightforward, which
likely helps to ensure that they are (i) dicult to denied by ocials and (ii) unlikely to be
interpreted by ocials as being investigative in nature.
Provided#5 contains topwords such as wage, benets, salary, and position. These
topwords, and many of this topic's top 50 most associated requests, together suggest that
the requests associated with this topic are often arising from state employees themselves,
who are seeking information about their own salary, benets, or positionoften over a
period encompassing their past several years of employment. A number of additional highly
associated requests seek more aggregate salary or compensation information, though these
again appear to be fairly straightforward and benign. For example, within some of the top
requests associated with this topic, a requester provides a Mexican agency with the agency's
own publicly available salary or compensation documentation (e.g., spreadsheet), and then
asks the agency to corroborate this information or to ll-in any missing information. Hence,
this topic appears to reect fairly apolitical requests for compensation-related information
(or assistance in completing an ocial document), as opposed to eorts by external actors
to scrutinize the employment practices of the agency receiving the request.
19Mexico's National Institute for Anthropology and History.
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In-Sample Summary Statistics
The above evaluations suggest that the ve sLDA topics that are most predictive of
denied requests tend to each exhibit clear political potential, with corresponding information
requests posing the potential to expose policy failures, wrongdoing, or misuse of oce in the
realms of security, banking, political appointments, or public procurement. By contrast,
the ve most commonly provided topics appear to instead seek out far more general, and
aggregate, information on government employment, budgets, personal job information, or
educational statistics. We hence interpret our sLDA model's identied topics as evidence
to suggest that variation in government nonresponsiveness to ATI requests is at least partly
the result of agencies' eorts to protect their own resources, reputation, or personnel.
To validate these ndings, we classied all in-sample requests according to their most
associated topic, and then created 10 binary indicators for whether (= 1) or not (= 0) each
in-sample request arose from one of our top-5 Denied or top-5 Provided topics. We then
separately classied each in-sample request for whether (= 1) or not (= 0) it was made
during a Mexican presidential election cycle, using data on the timing of each request.20 If
our Denied topics are indeed more politicized than our Provided topics, we would expect the
former to exhibit a stronger association with presidential election windowswhen eorts to
uncover policy failures, corruption, or government excesses are potentially more acute.21 We
assess this by examining the association between (i) each of our 10 (Denied or Provided)
binary topic indicators and (ii) our binary election period indicator via a series of χ2 tests
(see Table A.6). We nd that four out of ve Denied topics exhibit a statistically signicant
(p < 0.05) association with our presidential election indicator; whereas only one of our ve
Provided topics exhibits such an association. We then summed these Denied and Provided
requests to the monthly level,22 and calculated the share of all in-sample requests arising
20We dened this presidential election indicator as equal to one for months January-July during either
2006 or 2012, given that presidential elections occurred in July during these two sample years. Importantly,
the timing of each request was not included as a feature within our estimated models.
21Importantly, note that the binary topic measures described here do not incorporate any information on
the government's actual response to each request.
22Creating a dataset of 147 total observations.
22
from (i) the top-5 Denied topics and (ii) the top-5 Provided topics for our monthly time
series. Evaluating the dierence in means23 for each proportion across our aforemention
presidential election indicator, we found that our Denied requests encompass a reliably24
larger proportion of all requests during Presidential election cycles than outside of these
cycles, whereas this dierence is not statistically signicant25 for our Supplied requests.
Together, these ndings suggest that our Denied topics are more strongly associated with at
least one form of temporal variation in political scrutiny than are our Provided topics.
The above ndings notwithstanding, we are also interested in the representativeness of
our top ve Denied request topics. That is, while our Denied topics are clearly outliers in
terms of their respective rates of request-denials, and potentially in their levels of political
scrutiny, are these topics also outliers in terms of overall (low) request volume, or in terms
of their levels of specicity to only a single target agency (or geographic location)? If the
answer to these latter questions is yes, researchers may be concerned that our approach is
not identifying cross-cutting thematic request areas, but rather is simply identifying highly
specic (and idiosyncratic) problem requestors. To evaluate this potential, we return to our
sLDA-estimated word assignmentswhich we used above to identify the 50-most associated
requests with each topicand use these estimated word assignments to classify each and
every in-sample ATI request26 according to its most associated topic. This allows us to
recover the total number of in-sample ATI requests associated with each topic discussed
above. By comparing these classied in-sample requests to our metadata on each request's
target agency, the timing of each request, and each requestor's home municipality,27 we are
able to recover and evaluate the relative specicity of each topic over space and time.
In Table 2, we present the counts of in-sample requests, target agencies, and requestor
municipalities identied for each of our Denied and Provided topics via the approach de-
23Via a two-sided t-test.
24t = −1.95, df = 16.16, p− value = 0.068.
25t = −1.13, df = 16.29, p− value = 0.275.
26That is, the requests contained within the sample that was used to train our in-sample sLDA model,
which corresponded to 10% of our total corpus, or, approximately 100,000 total documents.
27Note that INFOMEX's publicly available metadata do not report actual requestor identities.
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scribed above. For further context, we also report the in-sample percentile ranking of each
specic count of requests, target agencies, and sending municipalities in this table. Fig-
ure A.3 in the Supplemental Appendix additionally provides plots of the variation in the
volume of our topic-indexed in-sample requests over time. Together these summary quan-
tities sharpen our understandings of the topics discussed above. First and foremost, the
percentiles in Table 2 indicate that our Denied topics exhibit comparable levels of request-
volumeand comparable levels of diversity in target agency and sending municipalityto
our remaining 240 topics. One exception is Denied#3, which ranks in the third percentile in
terms of total requests, target agency diversity, and sending municipalities. Based on these
results, we can thus interpret Denied#3which largely corresponded to politically-tinged
requests (to Mexico's Attorney General) for labor and salary informationas uncharacter-
istically concentrated in request volume. The time series plots in Figure A.3 conrm these
characterizations, in indicating a concentrated spike in Denied#3 requests in 2009.
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By comparison, the percentiles reported for the top ve Provided topics in Table 2 each
appear to be uncharacteristically large in request volume and request scope, as measured
by total request volume, diversity in target agency, and diversity in sending municipality.
Indeed, in nearly every case, we nd that the percentile rankings for our ve Provided
topics fall in the 80th-100th percentile range. Hence, whereas our top ve Denied topics are
generally representative of all topics in request volume and scope, the ve topics that our
sLDA model identies as most likely to have information provided together represent ve of
the largest, and most diverse (in terms of sending municipality and target agency) request
topics of all 250 topics identied. Figure A.3 rearms these ndings, in demonstrating that
each of our top ve Provided topics exhibits a high, and sustained, level of request volume
across the 2003-2015 period. Taken together, these ndings for our ve Provided topics are
good news for the functioning of the Mexican ATI system, as they imply that the largest
and most widespread request topics also happen to be among those that exhibit the highest
28Interestingly, Figures A.3 also reveals a substantial spike in requests associated with Denied#5 in 2013,
potentially indicating that this topic was similarly narrow in its temporal scope.
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levels of bureaucratic responsiveness.
Table 2: In-Sample Summary Statistics for Selected Topics
Documents per Topic Agencies per Topic Municipalities per Topic
# Documents Percentile # Agencies Percentile # Municipalities Percentile
Denied#1 324 51.6 82 44.8 61 48.0
Denied#2 276 44.4 68 26.0 61 48.0
Denied#3 99 2.8 27 3.2 18 3.6
Denied#4 187 20.0 63 21.2 38 14.8
Denied#5 250 38.0 68 26.0 53 31.6
Provided#1 1049 96.4 70 30.4 141 95.2
Provided#2 1788 100.0 80 42.8 208 100.0
Provided#3 724 88.4 152 90.4 120 90.8
Provided#4 681 84.8 158 95.6 103 83.6
Provided#5 1504 99.6 175 97.6 153 97.6
Note: median Documents per Topic = 318.5; median Agencies per Topic = 85, & median Municipalities
per Document = 63.
We further evaluate the uniqueness of our Provided and Denied topics by unpacking
the ve most middle leverage denied request topics from Figure 3 in our Supplemental
Appendix. The latter topics generally do not exhibit strong political potential, and instead
largely pertain to straightforward requests in areas such as aggregate government statistics,
procurement requests from service providers, tourism research, and higher education. These
topics' strengths of association with our previously described Mexican presidential election
cycle indicator also fall in between those identied for our Provided and Denied topics. This
together suggests that while our sLDA model is identifying theoretically coherent topics
across the entire range of coecient estimates reported in Figure 3, the requests underlying
our top-5 Denied topics are atypical in exhibiting high levels of political potential.
In-Sample Classication Results
We next evaluate the in-sample classication performance of our sLDA model. In doing
so, we construct two random coin-ip baselines for comparison, hereafter denoted ξ. For
our rst ξ, we generate random binary denied request data with probability 1
2
. For the
second ξ, we generate random binary denied request data with probability equal to the
mean of our true binary response ȳ = 0.1. As such, ξ = ȳ provides us with a random classier
that maximizes overall accuracy, whereas ξ = 1
2
provides us with a random classier that
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instead favors the improved identication of our less common class (i.e., nonresponsiveness).
We compare these two random classiers against our in-sample denied request sLDA
results with the aid of AUC-PRs, AUCs, precision, recall, F1 scores, and overall classication
accuracy. For our application, precision corresponds to the proportion of our model's denied
request predictions that were truly denied requests in our request data, whereas recall
corresponds to the share of all true denied request cases in our data that were accurately
predicted as such by our model. F1 scores are harmonic means of precision and recall, wherein
higher F1 values imply superior combined accuracy across both metrics. By contrast, overall
classication accuracy simply reports the proportion of all denied requests and all provided
requests that were classied correctly by our model. Given our preference for the accurate
prediction of our minority class (i.e., nonresponsiveness), we assign a cuto of 0.25 for the
calculation of precision, recall, F1 scores, and overall classication accuracy.
Table 3's AUC values imply that the sLDA model's in-sample predictions are notably
better than chance (AUC= 74.09). By comparison, ξ = 1
2
and ξ = ȳ obtain AUCs that are no
better than chance (of 50.36 and 50.00). This superior performance of sLDA is reinforced by
our sLDA model's consistently preferable AUC-PR, F1 score and precision values, relative to
those obtained under either ξ = 1
2
or ξ = ȳ. As expected, ξ = ȳ maximizes overall accuracy,
with a value (82.21) that is superior to ξ = 1
2
(49.75). However, the maximized accuracy
obtained under ξ = ȳ is well below that of sLDA (88.86), and comes at the cost of poorer
precision and recall relative to either ξ = 1
2
or sLDA. Finally, while sLDA underperforms in
recall relative to ξ = 1
2
(49.51 > 15.85), it makes up for this shortcoming with a precision of
34.00 for sLDA versus 9.57 for ξ = 1
2
. Given the latter strength, and those discussed above,
we can conclude that sLDA outperforms our ξ metrics in the in-sample context.
Table 3: In-Sample Classication Statistics
AUC-PR AUC Precision Recall F1score Accuracy
sLDA 26.26 74.09 34.00 15.85 21.62 88.86
ξ = 12 09.61 50.36 09.57 49.51 16.04 49.75
ξ = ȳ 09.69 50.00 09.70 10.05 09.87 82.21
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Out-of-Sample Results
We now turn to an evaluation of our sLDA model's out-of-sample classication proper-
ties. For this evaluation, we use our primary in-sample sLDA model to generate denied
request predictions for 30% of our total corpus (ie., 300,000 of our previously unexamined
documents). Using these predictions, we repeat the same steps as above in (re-)generating
our same two random classiers for comparison, ξ = 1
2
and ξ = ȳ. We then recalculate the
aforementioned set of classication statistics for each approach in Table 4.
Table 4: Out-of-Sample Classication Statistics
AUC-PR AUC Precision Recall F1score Accuracy
sLDA 25.57 73.23 33.34 15.33 21.01 88.83
ξ = 12 09.69 50.03 09.69 50.01 16.24 50.03
ξ = ȳ 09.75 50.15 09.94 10.25 10.09 82.32
Our out-of-sample classication ndings are highly consistent with our in-sample ndings.
As above, the sLDA model outperforms both random classiers in AUC-PR, AUC, precision,
F1 score, and overall accuracy, and performs second best (to ξ = ȳ) in recall. The results
reported in Table 4across all classierssuggest that our out-of-sample sLDA predictions
perform comparably to, albeit slightly worse than, our in-sample sLDA results. For example,
our sLDA model accurately classies 88.83% of all out-of-sample cases, whereas in the in-
sample context our sLDA model's overall accuracy was 88.86%. Dierences between these
two sets of sLDA predictions are slightly larger when one examines AUCs (74.09 vs. 73.23),
or AUC-PRs (26.26 vs. 25.57) though these dierences are again fairly negligible, especially
relative to the eect of one's choice of k on the in-sample AUCs obtained in Figures 1-2.
Robustness Tests
We further assess the robustness of our sLDA application in our Supplemental Appendix,
and summarize these assessments here. As a baseline check, we rst compare our sLDA ap-
proach to three widely used alternatives: logistic regression with a LASSO penalty, logistic
regression with a ridge penalty, and standard logistic regression. In all cases, we use a docu-
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ment term matrix29 that includes all unique (processed) wordstems alongside each request's
intended federal agency name as features. We leverage the remaining 10% of our full 2003-
2015 Mexican request text corpus for these model-based comparisons, which is equivalent
to roughly 100, 000 total requests. Herein, we randomly sub-divide this sample into new
sets of training requests (n = 25, 000) and test requests (n = 75, 000). We then use the
25, 000 training documents to re-estimate a new sLDA model alongside our logit, LASSO,
and ridge estimators, so as to ensure that the out-of-sample predictions generated by (i)
our sLDA model and (ii) our comparison models are comparable in terms of the size of the
training sample used. Details on tuning- and hyper-parameter selection for these models,
along with a table of out-of-sample classication statistics, appear in the Supplemental Ap-
pendix. Stated briey, we nd in these comparisons that sLDA outperforms LASSO, ridge,
and logistic regression across our most relevant metrics, including AUC-PR, recall and AUC.
Next, we compared our primary sLDA model's in-sample and out-of-sample predictive
results to a requests only sLDA model that omits our target agency names as features in our
Supplemental Appendix. For these comparisons, we repeat the analyses performed further
above when excluding the target agency names that are included as additional strings within
our main sLDA classication routines. We nd in the Supplemental Appendix that applying
sLDA models to our requests only text yields in-sample and out-of-sample predictions
of denied requests that perform slightly worse in classifying our true denied request
outcomes, relative to the primary sLDA model above that uses both the text of our requests
and these requests' target agency names as features. For example, the requests only model's
out-of-sample AUC is 71.47; noticeably worse than that of our primary sLDA model. Our
other comparison metrics yielded similar conclusions: the addition of target agency names
as features leads to small but consistent improvements in classication accuracy.
Our Supplemental Appendix also compares our primary sLDA model's in-sample Denied
and Supplied topics to the topics obtained from a 250-topic STM. As noted earlier, we
believe that sLDA's treatment of denied request as an outcome variable, rather than as an
29I.e., document-level counts.
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explanatory variableas is the case in an STMis most appropriate in our context. This
is because ocial responses to ATI requests arise after the generation of these requests by
citizens. Even so, estimating an STM that treats denied request as an independent variable
has the potential to (i) provide further insights into the stability of our sLDA model's Denied
and Provided topics, (ii) sharpen our overall understandings of high leverage topics in the
Mexico ATI request context, and (iii) oer evidence of the STM's eectiveness for needle-
in-a-haystack-type research tasks more generally. We identify a notable degree of topical
overlap among our top ve (sLDA) Denied and Supplied topics and the STM's most high
leverage (Denied and Supplied) topics, whilst also identifying a number of additional relevant
Denied topics from our STM. These ndings help to (re)arm the usefulness of both the
sLDA and the STM for the discovery of topics associated with denied requests. However,
we continue to favor the sLDA model given that its assumed data-generating process more
closely matches the actual temporal sequencing of requests and responses in our application.
Conclusion
Many forms of citizen-government interaction now take place electronically and generate
large amounts of data. Online access-to-information (ATI) systems are a prime example,
and have proliferated across the world in recent years. To study these new and complex
forms of big data, researchers need tools that can jointly account for (i) the nature, size,
and variety of request texts and (ii) the linkages between these texts and key outcomes of
interest. Governments likewise require similar big data tools to handle the immense volume
and complexity of these systems, especially in their eorts to monitor ATI responsiveness,
performance, and compliance.
We analyze over one million publicly available ATI request records from Mexico (2003-
2015) in order to demonstrate both the utility of these types of data sources for understanding
how bureaucratic responsiveness operates and the merits of supervised topic models for an-
alyzing these citizen-government interactions. We nd that the topical content of Mexico's
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ATI requests can predict responsiveness to these requests at levels noticeably better than a
variety of alternatives. This lends support to the use of supervised topic modeling methods
like sLDA for the study and monitoring of ATI systems. It also underscores the importance
thematic word clusters (i.e., relative to simpler term-based predictive models) in understand-
ing organizational behavior across large numbers of interactions.
The results from the sLDA analysis of our Mexico sample suggest, moreover, that politi-
cization plays a role in the Mexican ATI system, and in Mexican government agencies'
responsiveness to ATI requests more specically. To this end, it appears that requests in-
vestigating specic forms of corruption and ineciency receive lower responsiveness. This
nding complements recent research into analytical frameworks for, and empirical assess-
ments of, government corruption in public procurement elsewhere across the globe (Fazekas
and King, 2018). However, we also nd some evidence of unusually high responsiveness
related to local corruption in the education sector, suggesting a role of ATI systems for
re-alarm monitoring of local problems by the political center.
For those interested in applying text analysis methods to citizen-government interac-
tions, our application provides four additional insights. First, our ndings demonstrate that
integrations of citizen request data with supervised topic models can allow one to reliably
identify needle in the haystack topics that are particularly distinctive in their association
with rare bureaucratic outcomes. Second, we nd that researchers can use the topwords
and top-associated-requests from these distinctive topics to glean substantive insights into
the nature of a political or administrative process of interestspecically with regards to
the extremes of a process rather than its usual operation. Third, we show how one can
then associate one's identied topics with metadatasuch as information on a topic's rel-
ative concentration over space and timeto better understand when those extremes arise.
Fourth, we demonstrate that this framework also allows one to generate accurate predictions
of a rare outcome of interest, which could be useful to future citizen users of ATI systems,
to advocacy groups that monitor the performance of such systems, or to ocials themselves.
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